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Rider v. County of San Diego: "Special
Districts" and "Special Taxes" Under
Proposition 13
Initiative Proposition 13 was passed by the voters of California
over a decade ago. The courts were left with the difficult task of
interpreting that initiative as applied to numerous factual situa-
tions, a task made more difficult by the lack of any meaningful
legislative history. When San Diego County sought to finance cer-
tain judicial and criminal facilities with a sales tax increase, the
California Supreme Court had already laid out an analysis of
Proposition 13 that suggested the new tax was constitutionally im-
posed. However, upon challenge in Rider v. County of San Diego,
the California Supreme Court struck the tax down as violative of
Proposition 13. This Note analyzes that decision, the precedents
which suggested the tax was constitutional, and the concerns
raised by the decision. This Note illustrates the uncertainty inher-
ent in the initiative process and the obstacles which local govern-
ments face when attempting to manage their revenue-gathering
affairs.
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the voters of California limited the ability of state and
local taxing authorities to raise revenue by approving initiative Pro-
position 13.' The constitutionality of Proposition 13, which added ar-
ticle XIIIA to the California Constitution,2 was upheld in Amador
1. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 50-100.4
(West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (statutes implementing Proposition 13).
2. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6 provides:
Section 1. (a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property
shall not exceed one percent (1 %) of the full cash value of such property. The
one percent (I %) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned accord-
ing to law to the districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad
Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equali-
zation.3 In Amador, multiple constitutional challenges to Proposition
13 were consolidated. The supreme court only addressed "those prin-
cipal, fundamental challenges to the validity of [Proposition 13] as a
whole."4 Many specific definitional issues and provisional applica-
tions were left for later case analyses, and the resulting litigation
over the interpretation of these provisions has been enormous. 5
valorem taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption
charges on (1) any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to July 1, 1978,
or (2) any bonded indebtedness for the acquisition or improvement of real
property approved on or after July 1, 1978, by two-thirds of the votes cast by
the voters voting on the proposition.
Sec. 2. (a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of real
property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash value" or, thereaf-
ter, the appraised value of real property when purchased, newly constructed, or
a change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment. All real prop-
erty not already assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed
to reflect that valuation ...
(b) The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year ....
Sec. 3. From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in State
taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto
whether by increased rates or changes in methods of computation must be im-
posed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to
each of the two houses of the Legislature, except that no new ad valorem taxes
on real property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real property may
be imposed.
Sec. 4. Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the quali-
fied electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except
ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale
of real property within such City, County or special district.
Sec. 5. This article shall take effect for the tax year beginning on July I follow-
ing the passage of this Amendment, except Section 3 which shall become effec-
tive upon the passage of this article.
Sec. 6. If any section, part, clause, or phrase hereof is for any reason held to be
invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining sections shall not be affected but will
remain in full force and effect.
3. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
4. Id. at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241 (1978). For a discussion of
this case, see generally Julie K. Koyama, Comment, Financing Local Government in the
Post-Proposition 13 Era: The Use and Effectiveness of Nontaxing Revenue Sources, 22
PAC. L.J. 1333 (1991); Marian Adams Harvey, Note, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Commission of Webster County: Equal Protection in Property Taxation, A New
Challenge to Proposition 13?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173 (1989).
5. See generally Pacific S.W. Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles, I Cal. 4th 155,
820 P.2d 1046, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (1991); Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245, 806 P.2d 1360, 279 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1991); Title Ins. and
Trust Co. v. County of Riverside, 48 Cal. 3d 84, 767 P.2d 1148, 255 Cal. Rptr. 670
(1989); Heckendorn v. City of San Marino, 42 Cal. 3d 481, 723 P.2d 64, 229 Cal. Rptr.
324 (1986); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr.
726 (1986); Patton v. City of Alameda, 40 Cal. 3d 41, 706 P.2d 1135, 219 Cal. Rptr. I
(1985); Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100, 695 P.2d
220, 211 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985); Carman v. Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 318, 644 P.2d 192, 182
Cal. Rptr. 506 (1982); Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23
Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979).
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This Note addresses local taxing authorities' attempts to raise rev-
enues within the limitations of article XIIIA, section 4.6 Section 4
requires a two-thirds voter approval for special taxes enacted by cit-
ies, counties, and special districts.7 In Rider v. County of San Di-
ego,8 the California Supreme Court was faced with interpreting
"special districts" and "special taxes" within the meaning of section
4. The issue was whether the County of San Diego, through the
newly created San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financing
Agency, had effectively satisfied the command of section 4 when it
sought to fund judicial facilities with a local sales tax. This Note will
analyze this issue by introducing the facts of Rider, examining the
case precedents dealing with section 4 interpretation, and then exam-
ining the court's majority opinion, concurrence, and dissenting opin-
ions. Finally, this Note will discuss the impact of the court's holding
and present some issues left unsettled.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1985, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors addressed its
need for additional funding for local courtrooms and jail facilities 9
by seeking the creation of a special county fund for administrating
and operating these facilities."0 An election held in November 1986
failed to produce the two-thirds voter approval required by section
4.11 The board of supervisors then requested a local legislator to in-
troduce state legislation to create a limited purpose special district
with limited taxing powers. In 1987, the state legislature passed the
San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financing Act.12 The
Act created the San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financ-
ing Agency,13 which is a board composed of seven directors. 4 The
6. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4. "Section 4. Cities, counties and special districts,
by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on
such district, except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on
the sale of real property within such City, County or special district." Id.
7. Id.
8. 1 Cal. 4th 1, 820 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (1991).
9. Hereinafter referred to as judicial facilities.
10. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 9, 820 P.2d at 1004, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494.
11. The measure was supported by only 51 % of the voters. Id.
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26250-85 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
13. Id. § 26260. "'Agency' means the San Diego County Regional Justice Facility
Financing Agency." Id. § 26253.
14. Id. § 26261(a). Two board members are also members of the county board of
supervisors. Id. § 26261(a)(1).
Act called for the adoption of a retail transactions and use tax",
within the county if approved by a majority of the electors voting on
the measure at a special election."6 The Agency was given no other
taxing power.
17
In June 1988, a tax ordinance adopted by the Agency was submit-
ted to the voters. The voters approved the tax by a bare majority.18
The Agency then began operations and hired personnel. The tax
went into effect on January 1, 1989.11 To date, the tax has raised
approximately $200 million and was anticipated to bring in $1.6 bil-
lion in revenues during the Agency's 10-year term. 0
Soon after the tax was passed, certain taxpayers in the county
brought suit challenging the validity of the sales tax.2' Their com-
plaint asserted three causes of action:
1) [t]he tax violated the requirement of section 4 of Article XIII A of the
California Constitution (Proposition 13) that local "special" taxes be ap-
proved by a two-thirds vote;
2) the tax violated the requirement contained in Proposition 62 ([CAL,
GOV'T CODE] §§ 53720-53730) that special taxes imposed by a district be
approved by a two-thirds vote; and
3) the tax violated the proscription against "excess appropriations" set forth
in Article XIII B of the California Constitution.2"
The trial court found for the taxpayers, stating that the sales tax
was a "deliberate and unlawful avoidance of Proposition 13" and
violated the two-thirds voter approval requirement for local special
taxes.2 3 On appeal, the court of appeal reversed, holding that Pro-
position 13 did not apply, and, alternatively, even if two-thirds voter
approval was required, such a requirement would be an unconstitu-
tional local tax referendum.* The court of appeal reasoned that
since the Agency was not empowered to levy a property tax, it was
not a "special district" within the meaning of section 4.26
15. This tax will be referred to as the "sales tax" throughout this Note.
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26271. The rate of tax authorized, if approved by the
voters, was 0.5%. Id. § 26275.
17. Id. § 26283.
18. 50.8% of the voters approved the measure. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 9, 820 P.2d at
1005, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495.
19. Id.
20. Id. The revenues have been collected, but not spent. Id. at 6, 820 P.2d at 1002,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492.
21. Id. The challenge was authorized under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 863 (West
1980) (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26282 referred to this civil procedure code section). See CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 26282.
22. Rider v. County of San Diego, 272 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859 (1990), superseded by,
799 P.2d 1280, 274 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1990), rev'd, I Cal. 4th 1, 820 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 490 (1991). At trial, the taxpayers focused on their Proposition 13 and Proposi-
tion 62 arguments, deciding not to pursue the article XIIIB cause of action. Id.
23. Id. The trial court declared the tax invalid and did not rule on the Proposition
62 arguments. Id. at 859 n.4. See infra note 27 on Proposition 62.
24. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 6, 820 P.2d at 1002-03, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-93 (1991).
25. 272 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (1990). See supra note 6. In deciding that Proposition
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In December 1991, the California Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeal decision and found the sales tax invalid (under Pro-
position 13) because it failed to meet the two-thirds voter approval
requirement of section 4.26 The majority opinion was joined by a
concurring opinion of Justice George, who believed the tax should
have been found invalid under the statutory provisions of Proposition
62.27 Justice Mosk wrote a strong dissent which argued that the ma-
jority effectively ignored precedent and seriously jeopardized local
governmental financing efforts.28 Justice Kennard also dissented,
agreeing with Justice Mosk that the Agency was not a special dis-
trict within the meaning of section 4.29
To thoroughly understand the opinions in Rider, a discussion of
the section 4 precedents is warranted. One case focused on the
meaning of "special district," the other with "special taxes." Be-
cause these two cases attempted to define both key terms, each pre-
cedent has particular relevance to the Rider decision.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 4
Two cases decided almost ten years ago dealt with some of the
definitional problems arising from section 4. Local governments have
presumably followed these decisions in structuring their revenue-
raising activities. Each precedent had been followed in interpreting
section 4, but as will be presented below, the holdings in these
landmark cases have been either significantly narrowed or perhaps
overruled by Rider (though not explicitly).
13 was inapplicable, the court of appeal held that "Richmond is dispositive of the Pro-
position 13 argument. Id. at 860. See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text
(discussing Richmond).
26. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 5-16, 820 P.2d at 1002-09, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-99.
27. Id. at 16-25, 820 P.2d at 1010-16, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500-06 (George, J.,
concurring). Justice Panelli concurred in this opinion. See infra notes 82-90 and accom-
panying text. Proposition 62 was passed on November 4, 1986 and added §§ 53720-30 to
the California Government Code. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53720-30 (West Supp.
1992). Of importance here, § 53722 provides that "[n]o local government or district may
impose any special tax unless and until such special tax is submitted to the electorate of
the local government, or district and approved by a two-thirds vote of the voters voting in
an election on the issue." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53722. Section 53723 provides that "[n]o
local government, or district, whether or not authorized to levy a property tax, may im-
pose any general tax unless ... such general tax is ... approved by a majority vote of
the voters .. " CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53723. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53721 (defin-
ing general and special taxes).
28. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 25-35, 820 P.2d at 1016-22, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506-12
(Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
29. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 35, 820 P.2d at 1022-23, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-13 (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting). See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
A. Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v.
Richmond:30 "Special District"
In 1976, the California legislature created the Los Angeles
County Transportation Commission (LACTC) to oversee the public
transportation system in Los Angeles county.31 LACTC was author-
ized to adopt a sales tax of one-half of one percent on the sale, stor-
age, or use of personal property in Los Angeles county if approved
by a majority of the county's voters who voted in the election.3 2
LACTC had no authority to levy a property tax.33 Although the vot-
ers approved the sales tax by a simple majority (but less than two-
thirds), LACTC's executive director refused to implement the tax,
believing it was invalid under the requirements of section 4.34
LACTC filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel implementa-
tion of the tax. 35 The California Supreme Court issued a peremptory
writ, finding that the tax could be imposed consistent with Proposi-
tion 13.36
Of special importance is the supreme court's analysis of a "special
district" within the meaning of section 4. The court held that a "spe-
cial district" (in terms of section 4) was one which had the power to
levy a property tax. "[T]he goal of article XIIIA is real property tax
relief, and a governmental body like LACTC, which does not have
the power to levy a property tax, is not the type of 'special district'
governed by the section.
' ' a3
In" addressing the meaning of "special districts," the court consid-
ered the two-thirds voter requirement, the ambiguity of the section 4
provision itself, and uncertain voter intent in passing Proposition 13.
"In view of the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the require-
ment for an extraordinary majority . . . the language of section 4
must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of per-
mitting voters of cities, counties and 'special districts' to enact 'spe-
cial taxes' by a majority rather than a two-thirds vote.' 38 In what
appears to be a thorough analysis, the court proceeded to define
"special district" as it relates to section 4 and as probably intended
30. 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982).
31. Id. at 199, 643 P.2d at 941-42, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
32. Id. at 199, 643 P.2d at 942, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 200, 643 P.2d at 942", 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325. The advice of the Attorney
General prompted this refusal. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
37. Id. at 201, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (referring to § 4).
38. Id. at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The court offered no cases
in support of this conclusion. Id.
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by the voters.39 "[T]here are strong policy reasons for holding that
if, as here, the intention of the voters to require a two-thirds vote is
not clear, a majority is to be deemed sufficient for the valid adoption
of a 'special tax.' "4'
In the Richmond case, no occasion for intentional circumvention
of Proposition 13 was presented. The majority, in what arguably was
dictum, declined to find this particular taxing activity as intended to
avoid the purpose of Proposition 13.41 The LACTC was created
before Proposition 13 was enacted, even though the sales tax was
passed following the adoption of Proposition 1342 A dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Richardson criticized this aspect of the majority's
holding, as well as the rule of strict construction announced by the
plurality.43
The majority in Richmond held that to come within section 4, a
"special district" must have the power to levy a property tax. This
definition had been followed by the courts until the recent decision in
Rider.44
39. Id. at 205-08, 643 P.2d at 945-47, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328-30. The court re-
viewed the voter's pamphlet that accompanied initiative Proposition 13 and "some basic
facts" about California property taxes. Id. at 205-06, 643 P.2d at 945-46, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 328-29. The court likewise discussed the legislature's interpretation of "special dis-
tricts" following the enactment of Proposition 13. Id. at 206-07, 643 P.2d at 946-47, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 329-30. The court noted that some subsequently enacted statutes excluded
entities which could not levy property taxes from the term "special district," while others
specifically defined its coverage. Id.
40. Id. at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
41. Id.
Nor are we impressed with a suggestion that our interpretation of section 4
could result in the wholesale avoidance of the purpose of article XIIIA by the
Legislature, which could reorganize existing "special districts" to remove their
property-taxing power or create new ones without such power, thereby allowing
them to adopt a "special tax" by majority vote. We cannot assume that the
Legislature will attempt to avoid the goals of article XIIIA by such a device.
In any event, that problem can be dealt with if and when the issue arises. The
legislation creating LACTC and granting it the power to levy only a sales tax
antedated Proposition 13 by two years. Thus, there can be no claim here that
the Legislature was attempting to evade the restrictions imposed by section 4.
Id.
42. Id. at 199-200, 643 P.2d at 941-42, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
43. Id. at 209-19, 643 P.2d at 948-54, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331-37 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). "The majority has cut a hole in the financial fence which the people in their
Constitution have erected around their government. Governmental entities may be ex-
pected, instinctively, to pour through the opening seeking the creation of similar revenue-
generating entities in myriad forms which will be limited only by their ingenuity." Id. at
213, 643 P.2d at 950, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
44. See, e.g., Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100,
695 P.2d 220, 211 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985); City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell,
32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
B. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell:40
"Special Taxes"
In Farrell, the California Supreme Court held that tax proceeds
which were placed in the city's general fund for general expenditures
were not "special taxes" within the meaning of section 4.4' The tax
proceeds in this case came from a tax of 1.1 percent on payrolls or
gross receipts of businesses operating in the city of San Francisco.41
On May 29, 1980, the mayor approved an appropriation of $1.1 mil-
lion from the proceeds of this tax to help finance elevator system
improvements at the Laguna Honda Hospital. 48 The city controller,
Farrell, refused to certify that funds were available for that expendi-
ture.49 The city sought a writ of mandate to compel Farrell to certify
the funds for the proposed appropriation.
50
The supreme court began by discussing and applying the rule of
strict construction as developed in Richmond."' Farrell claimed that
"special taxes" meant "extra, additional, or supplemental charge[s]
imposed ... to raise money for public purposes."' ,2 The court re-
sponded, "Farrell's claim ... effectively reads the word 'special' out
of the statute, since any taxes imposed by a local entity following
adoption of article XIIIA would be encompassed within those de-
scriptive terms. ' 53 "[T]he language of section 4 appears to support
the city's assertion that 'special taxes' refers to a particular type of
tax rather than to any and all exactions."'"
The court addressed the ballot pamphlet accompanying Proposi-
tion 13, finding little guidance in it; legislation passed after the en-
actment of article XIIIA also offered little assistance. 0 Faced with
this unclear intent, the court stated,
45. 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
46. Id. at 56-57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
47. Id. at 51, 648 P.2d at 936, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 714. This tax rate was increased
to 1.5% and a subsequent initiative measure extending this increase was passed by 55%
of the voters. Id.
48. Id. at 51, 648 P.2d at 937, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
49. He contended that the increased tax was a "special tax," thus not meeting the
two-thirds voter approval requirement of § 4. Id.
50. The city offered two arguments. First, the city claimed that § 4 did not apply
to charter cities. Second, the city claimed that "special taxes" only apply to taxes
earmarked for a specific purpose. The court accepted this second argument. Id.
51. Id. at 52-53, 648 P.2d at 937-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16. "We recognized
[in Richmond] that section 4 is ambiguous in various respects, and that, although its
language is framed affirmatively so as to authorize local entities to adopt 'special taxes,'
it is actually a limitation on the enactment of such taxes because it requires a two-thirds
vote for their approval." Id. at 53, 648 P.2d at 938, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 716. See supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
52. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 53-54, 648 P.2d at 938, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
53. Id. at 54, 648 P.2d at 938-39, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
54. Id. at 54, 648 P.2d at 939, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
55. Id. at 54-56, 648 P.2d at 939-40, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18.
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Our choice here is not simply between acceptance of one of a number of
different meanings of an ambiguous term in a statute, but between disre-
garding the word "special" altogether in section 4, or affording it some
meaning consistent with the intent of the voters in enacting the provision.
Application of the rule of strict construction of provisions which require.
extraordinary majorities for the enactment of legislation is particularly ap-
propriate in these circumstances.
In keeping with these principles, we construe the term "special taxes" in
section 4 to mean taxes which are levied for a specific purpose rather than,
as in the present case, a levy placed in the general fund to be utilized for
general governmental purposes."6
In dissent, Justice Richardson renewed his concern expressed in
Richmond. "The majority ...widens still further the hole which
they have cut in that protective fence which the people of California
thought they had constructed around their collective purse by adop-
tion of article XIIIA, a fence which the majority first breached in
Richmond.
'57
Il1. RIDER V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
Justice Richardson's dissenting opinions in Richmond and Farrell
received new life when the California Supreme Court reconsidered
both the issues of "special districts" and "special taxes" in Rider v.
County of San Diego.
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority found the sales tax invalid because it was not ap-
proved by two-thirds of the voters in San Diego County as required
by section 4.18 In arriving at its decision, the majority confronted its
previous decisions calling for strict construction of article XIIIA,
both as it related to "special districts" and "special taxes. 59 By
turning to language in Amador Valley Joint Union High School
District v. State Board of Equalization,6 0 the majority laid a foun-
dation that supported its analysis:
As we stated in Amador . . ., upholding the validity of Proposition 13,
"since any tax savings resulting from the operation of sections 1 and 2 [the
property tax rate and assessment limitations of the measure] could be with-
drawn or depleted by additional or increased state or local levies of other
than property taxes, section 3 [providing that increased state taxes require
56. Id. at 56-57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
57. Id. at 57, 648 P.2d at 941, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
58. Rider v. County of San Diego, 1 Cal. 4th 1, 5, 820 P.2d 1000, 1002, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 490, 492 (1991).
59. See supra notes 38, 51, 56 and accompanying text.
60. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
legislative approval by a two-thirds vote] and 4 combine to place restric-
tions upon the imposition of such taxes."
In other words, section 4's restriction on local taxes is part of an "inter-
locking 'package' deemed necessary by the initiative's framers to assure ef-
fective real property tax relief." 61
With this "interlocking package" in mind, the majority proceeded
to redefine section 4's "special districts" and "special taxes." Not
surprisingly, the majority re-introduced Justice Richardson's. dissent-
ing opinion concerns about circumvention of Proposition 13's
supermajority voting requirements.62 The majority gave strong
weight to the trial court's determination that "'Proposition 13 has
been purposely circumvented' by the act which formed the
Agency."63 This "purposeful avoidance" of section 4 underlies the
majority's analysis of the San Diego County sales tax scheme.
The majority first focused on the term "special district," holding
that "the Agency must be deemed a 'special district' under section 4,
despite its lack of power to levy a tax on real property."64 The ma-
jority felt that Richmond's "power to levy a property tax" definition
was not binding when the district in question was formed for the sole
purpose of circumventing section 4.65 Accordingly, the intent and
motivation of the legislature in creating the "special district" became
an issue.
The majority saw the court of appeal's reliance on Richmond as
an unwarranted extension of that precedent:
The fact that, following Richmond, numerous "special purpose" districts
were created to accomplish aims comparable to LACTC strongly indicates
a large "hole" has indeed been created in Proposition 13, confirming Justice
Richardson's prediction. In our view, the framers of Proposition 13, and the
voters who adopted it, would not have intended that result. 68
The majority found Richmond's limitation of "special districts" to
those possessing property tax powers as unworkable because such an
agency did not exist. "iT]he proposed extension of Richmond to all
districts, whenever created, which lack property tax power would
read section 4's reference to 'special districts' out of existence as ap-
plied to districts formed after 1978. ' '67 Thus, the majority in Rider
61. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 7, 820 P.2d at 1003, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 (citations
omitted).
62. Id. at 8, 820 P.2d at 1004, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494. See supra notes 43, 57 and
accompanying text.
63. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 8, 820 P.2d at 1004, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494. "[Tlhe
Agency 'was created solely for the purpose of avoiding the strictures of Proposition 13.'
In addition .... the Court of Appeal deemed the Agency 'an empty shell' used by the
County to exercise its own fiscal discretion. The record amply supports those findings."
Id.
64. Id. at 10, 820 P.2d at 1005, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495.
65. Id. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
66. Rider, I Cal. 4th at I1, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496 (citations
omitted).
67. Id.
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presented a new definition: "[W]e hold that 'special district' would
include any local taxing agency created to raise funds for city or
county purposes to replace revenues lost by reason of the restriction
of Proposition 13.1168
The majority found that in this case, the evidence of purposeful
circumvention was strong; however, they conceded that proving in-
tentional circumvention could be difficult.69 Therefore, the majority
set forth its "essential control" test as a means of reasonably infer-
ring intention to circumvent Proposition 13.1o "[W]e believe that
courts may infer such intent whenever the plaintiff has proved the
new tax agency is essentially controlled by one or more cities or
counties that otherwise would have had to comply with the
supermajority provision of section 4."71 The majority's "essential
control" test is applied to determine if that control exists.
The majority then proceeded to its analysis of a "special tax"
within the meaning of section 4, since section 4 requires both a "spe-
cial district" and a "special tax."7 The Agency argued that even if
it was a "special district," its taxes were not "earmarked for any
special purposes within the Agency," but are to be placed in a gen-
eral fund for the general purposes of the Agency.7" The majority
disagreed, finding instead that the tax revenues were collected for
the "special and limited governmental purposes of constructing and
operating the County's justice facilities.
'74
The majority analyzed the Farrell case and held that its rationale
68. Id. Presumably, this situation is proved by utilizing the "essential control" test
and looking to intentional circumvention of Proposition 13. See infra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text.
69. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
70. Id. at 11-12, 820 P.2d at 1006-07, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. The majority held:
In determining whether such control exists, a variety of considerations may'
be relevant, including the presence or absence of (1) substantial municipal con-
trol over agency operations, revenues or expenditures, (2) municipal ownership
or control over agency property or facilities, (3) coterminous physical bounda-
ries, (4) common or overlapping governing boards, (5) municipal involvement
in the creation or formation of the agency, and (6) agency performance of
functions customarily or historically performed by municipalities and financed
through levies of property taxes.
Id. at 11-12, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
71. Id. at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
72. CAL, CONsT. art. XIIIA, § 4. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
73. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 13, 820 P.2d at 1007-08, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497-98. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26272. "The purposes for which the tax may be imposed are the
general governmental purposes of the agency as set forth in Section 26267." Id.
74. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 13, 820 P.2d at 1008, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. See gener-
ally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26267.
did not extend to limited purpose agencies.78 The Agency and county
argued that the tax was a "general tax" nonetheless because the leg-
islature expressly designated it a "general tax" 76 and the revenues
are to be used for "general governmental purposes. '77 The majority
rejected this line of argument, both as to legislative designation 8
and as to the "general purpose" usage.7 9 Instead, the majority set
out a new definition:
[A] "special tax" is one levied to fund a specific governmental project or
program .... It is true that, under the foregoing principle, every tax levied
by a "special purpose" district or agency would be deemed a "special tax."
But this interpretation seems most consistent with the probable intent of the
framers of Proposition 13.80
The majority, after finding the sales tax violative of Proposition
13, did not address the challenge under Proposition 62. The court
likewise refused to rule on the issue of prospective only application of
its decision. The majority, in its conclusion, stated its reluctance to
interfere with local projects such as this, but emphasized its duty to
apply the mandates of Proposition 13.81
B. The Concurrence
Justice George wrote a concurring opinion that stressed that the
decision should be based on Proposition 62, rather than the constitu-
tional provisions of Proposition 13.82 This opinion was founded on
concepts of judicial restraint and on the avoidance of "re-defining"
75. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 14, 820 P.2d at 1008, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. See supra
notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
76. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26251.
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26272. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
78. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 14-15, 820 P.2d at 1008-09, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498-99.
"[S]uch nomenclature is of minor importance in light of the realities underlying its adop-
tion and its probable object and effect." Id. (referring to Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. v.
Johnson, 13 Cal. 2d 545, 550, 90 P.2d 572, 575 (1939) (legislative designation entitled to
"some weight" but not conclusive)).
79. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 15, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499. "[I]t would
be anomalous if the 'special' tax of one agency could so readily become the 'general' one
of another." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 16, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499. "Proposition 13 and its
limitations on local taxation are constitutional mandates of the people which we are
sworn to uphold and enforce." Id.
82. Id. at 16-25, 820 P.2d at 1010-16, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500-06 (George, J.,
concurring). Justice Panelli concurred in this opinion. See supra note 27.
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the term "special district."8' 3 Justice George was convinced that non-
constitutional provisions should furnish the basis of decision if appli-
cable.8 4 "[I]n my view, the provisions of Proposition 62 provide a
much clearer and more straightforward basis for the decision in this
case than the provisions of Proposition 13, on which the majority
opinion relies." 85
Using Proposition 62 to challenge the sales tax, Justice George
found section 53722 applicable to the Agency.86 This analysis would
eliminate the need to classify the Agency as a "special district" and
would likewise eliminate the necessity of presenting the "essential
control" test.87 In addition, Proposition 62 contains a specific provi-
sion defining the term "special tax."88
Justice George addressed the Agency's constitutional challenge to
Proposition 62 and held that it survived constitutional attack.8 9 Jus-
tice George joined the majority decision, however, agreeing that the
tax was invalid under Proposition 13 as well.90
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion that strongly opposed
both the result of the case and the majority's analysis.9 His dissent
fervently advocated the use of stare decisis concerning the Richmond
83. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 16-17, 820 P.2d at 1010, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 (George,
J., concurring). "In my view, the majority's approach is inconsistent with well-established
principles of judicial restraint." Id. at 17, 820 P.2d at 1010, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
84. Id. "It is a well-established principle that this Court will not decide constitu-
tional questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues of the
case." See Palermo v. Stockton Theaters, 32 Cal. 2d 53, 66, 195 P.2d 1, 9 (1948) (citing
Alma Motor Co. v. Timkin-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129 (1946); Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947)).
85. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 18, 820 P.2d at 10 11, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501 (George, J.,
concurring). Proposition 62, set out in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53722, provides, "No local
government or district may impose any special tax unless and until such special tax is
submitted to the electorate of the local government, or district and approved by a two-
thirds vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53722.
86. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 18, 820 P.2d at 1011, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501. "[S]ection
53722 applies to all "local government[s]" or "district[s]." Id.
87. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53721. "General taxes are taxes imposed for general gov-
ernmental purposes. Special taxes are taxes imposed for specific purposes." Id.
89. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 20-24, 820 P.2d at 1012-15, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-05
(George, J., concurring). This Note does not discuss the constitutionality of Proposition
62; therefore, this section of the concurring opinion is presented only to summarize Jus-
tice George's conclusion.
90. Id. at 25, 820 P.2d at 1015, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505.
91. Id. at 25-35, 820 P.2d at 1016-22, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506-12 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
and Farrell decisions.92 Justice Mosk felt that the California Su-
preme Court had ruled on the definition of "special districts" and
"special taxes" in these two cases and that local governments had
relied on their precedential value for over a decade.
Justice Mosk began by stressing Richmond applied to agencies
created after Proposition 13 was enacted. According to Justice
Mosk, the majority "limit[ed] the holding of Richmond to entities
established before Proposition 13 was enacted, a view of the decision
no fair-minded reader could accept. ' 93 Justice Mosk discounted the
dictum of Richmond concerning post-Proposition 13 agency creation
as not confining the Richmond holding. 94 Equally critical, he argued
for continued strict construction of section 4.1
The dissenting opinion likewise criticized the use of legislative mo-
tivation in invalidating a tax under section 4.
I fail to see how the question whether a governmental body is a "special
district" can, as the majority suggest, depend on the intent of the Legisla-
ture in its formation, given the general rule that the motivation of the Leg-
islature or its members in passing legislation- is immaterial to questions
involving the validity of legislation.9"
"[A]lthough the universal rule forbids inquiry into the motives of the
Legislature in enacting a statute, the majority's holding compels an
examination of such motives .. .
Justice Mosk mentioned the failure of Proposition 36 as indicative
92. Id. at 25, 820 P.2d at 1016, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506. "Although the majority
opinion purports not to do so, it ignores stare decisis and effectively overrules our deci-
sions in Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond and City and County of
San Francisco v. Farrell." Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id.
We held, without reservation, that the term special district, as used in section
4, refers only to those districts which may levy a tax on real property. All the
justices except one in dissent concurred in the principle upon which our conclu-
sion was based . . .because that provision was aimed at prohibiting the "re-
placement" of "lost" property taxes with other taxes.
Id. at 26, 820 P.2d at 1016, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506.
94. Id. at 26, 820 P.2d at 1017, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507. See supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
95. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 27, 820 P.2d at 1017, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
[T]he majority recite the holding of Richmond... that the elitist requirement
for a supermajority is "fundamentally undemocratic," and that the language of
section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of per-
mitting voters to enact measures by a majority vote. Nevertheless the major-
ity's construction of section 4 violates this unequivocal rule.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 27, 820 P.2d at 1017, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507. See California Teachers
Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist., 28 Cal. 3d 692, 699-700, 621 P.2d 856,
860, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821 (1981); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.
3d 721, 726-31, 532 P.2d 495, 498-502, 119 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634-38 (1975); City of
Atascadero v. Daly, 135 Cal. App. 3d 466, 471, 185 Cal. Rptr. 228, 230-31 (1982).
97. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 28, 820 P.2d at 1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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of a section 4 reading contrary to the majority's holding. 8 According
to Justice Mosk, the failure of Proposition 36 reinforces the correct-
ness of the Richmond holding in that any redefining of "special dis-
tricts" could be accomplished most accurately through the initiative
process.
The dissenting opinion's final assault on the majority's- "special
district" analysis concerned its newly devised "essential control" test.
"[T]he 'essential control' test propounded by the majority as the tool
to expose circumventive intent is unworkable." 99 Justice Mosk briefly
presented several situations where the majority's test factors simply
would be of little utility, especially in light of past decisions.' 00 The
use of this new test "will threaten the taxing powers of many, if not
most, California districts formed in the last 13 years."'' 0
Turning to the issue of "special taxes," Justice Mosk was no less
critical. "The majority's conclusion regarding special taxes is, if any-
thing, even more egregious.' 0 2 Justice Mosk was disturbed by the
majority's treatment of Farrell, suggesting that the majority's new
view on "special taxes" effectively applies section 4's two-thirds voter
approval requirement to any taxes applied by a "special district."' 0 3
Justice Mosk strengthened his reasoning by pointing to Proposition
62, which statutorily defines special and general taxes.104 According
to the dissent, passage of Proposition 62 reflected the intention of
voters in continuing the Farrell definitional scheme.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Mosk concluded by discussing
the "profound and unsettling consequences" of the majority's deci-
sion.10 5 The billions of dollars at stake and the reliance on Richmond
98. Id. Proposition 36 was presented to the voters in 1984.
[It] would have repealed and reenacted section 4 to require that any measure
which resulted in increasing taxes levied on a taxpayer must be adopted by a
two-thirds vote .... [T]he voters were given the opportunity to enact a provi-
sion that would have accomplished what the majority opinion does today, but
they rejected the measure.
Id. (emphasis removed).
Another attempt at repealing § 4 and enacting a new § 4 was also rejected when the
voters failed to pass Proposition 136 at the November 6, 1990 election.
99. Id. at 29, 820 P.2d at 1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508.
100. Id. at 29, 820 P.2d at 1018-19, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508-09.
101. Id. at 29, 820 P.2d at 1019, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 509.
102. Id. at 30, 820 P.2d at 1019, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 509.
103. Id. "In Farrell, we rejected the argumeft that the term 'special' has no mean-
ing in section 4." Id.
104. Id. at 31, 820 P.2d at 1020, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510. See supra notes 82-88
and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 31-35, 820 P.2d at 1020-22, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510-12 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
and Farrell were of special concern. Justice Mosk noted that this
decision not only affected the County of San Diego, but also many
others who have acted on, contracted with, or financed the Agency's
operations to date.1' Of significance to Justice Mosk, the Rider
holding could have a disastrous impact on "numerous local taxing
entities that carry out essential governmental functions. "107
Lastly, Justice Mosk felt that the majority's holding should have
been declared prospective only.0 8 Conceding that it is not inappro-
priate to apply the majority decision to this case, Justice Mosk ex-
pressed great concern about the ruling's impact on multiple
obligations by other agencies. 0 9 "[W]hen we overrule our earlier au-
thority, considerations of fairness may require prospective applica-
tion of our new holding, particularly when contracts have been made
or property rights acquired in accordance with the prior decision." 110
Especially since the majority decided that legislative intent was de-
terminative, Justice Mosk felt that local governmental entities and
their contracting parties were justified in relying on Richmond."'
Justice Kennard also dissented, agreeing with Justice Mosk that
the Agency was not a "special district" within the meaning of sec-
tion 4.112 Justice Kennard stated that the majority's interpretation of
"special taxes" was "overbroad," but expressed no view on prospec-
tive application.'"
D. Analysis
The California Supreme Court in Rider appears to have discarded
two precedents in arriving at its decision." 4 Both the Richmond case
106. For example, bondholders, contractors, employees, and others have entered
into contracts with the Agency. Justice Mosk also was concerned that matching funds
from state and federal governments were jeopardized. Id. at 32, 820 P.2d at 1020, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 510.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 33, 820 P.2d at 1021, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511.
109. Id. at 34, 820 P.2d at 1022, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512.
110. Id. at 33, 820 P.2d at 1021, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 305, 758 P.2d 58, 69, 250
Cal. Rptr. 116, 127 (1988); Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 151-52, 642
P.2d 1305, 1306-07, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 785-86 (1982); County of Los Angeles v. Faus,
48 Cal. 2d 672, 680-81, 312 P.2d 680, 685-86 (1957).
11I. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 34-35, 820 P.2d at 1022, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 35, 820 P.2d at 1022-23, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-13.
113. Id. at 35, 820 P.2d at 1023, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513.
114. See supra notes 64-68, 75-80 and accompanying text. But see Vernon v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 4 Cal. App. 4th 110, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (1992) (California Su-
preme Court previously found LACTC not a "special district" under § 4, thus local tax
valid even though two-thirds voter approval was not acquired).
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and the Farrell case defined key terms in section 4;115 yet, the major-
ity in Rider, dissatisfied with the results of using these definitions in
this case, redefined "special districts" and "special taxes." Justice
Mosk's dissenting opinion criticized this approach,116 and this Note
will address those dissenting concerns by analyzing the precedents
and discussing the effects of the Rider decision.
1". Treatment of Precedent
Three separate issues arise in the court's analysis of Richmond
and Farrell; these include the actual holding of those two cases, the
use of the rule of strict construction in interpreting section 4, and the
introduction of legislative intent into the analysis of "special dis-
tricts." This Note presents each issue separately to better assist in
understanding the Rider decision.
The California Supreme Court in Richmond held that "a govern-
mental body like LACTC, which does not have the power to levy a
property tax, is not the type of 'special district' governed by [section
4]. ' 117 At the end of the majority opinion, the court addressed the
concern of possible intentional circumvention of Proposition 13.118
"[T]hat problem can be dealt with if and when the issue arises.""' 9
This language seems qualified, however, by the majority's reasoning
in arriving at its definition of "special districts."'120 The Richmond
court felt the power to levy a property tax was the determinative
factor in being classified a "special district," at least when circum-
vention motivations were absent.
There can be little doubt that the Rider decision changed the defi-
nition of "special districts" in terms of section 4. To that extent, the
precedential value of Richmond was almost entirely eliminated; no
115. See supra notes 37, 56 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 91-i11 and accompanying text.
117. Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 201, 643
P.2d 941, 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324, 326 (1991). See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying
text.
118. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330. See
supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
119. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
120. Id. "To the extent section 4 clearly requires a particular entity to obtain the
consent of two-thirds of the voters, it affords the 'effective' property tax relief we dis-
cussed in Amador .... [T]here are strong policy reasons for holding that if, as here, the
intention of the voters to require a two-thirds vote is not clear, a majority is to be deemed
sufficient for the valid adoption of a 'special tax.'" Id.
longer is the power to levy property taxes the decisive factor.12' Like-
wise, the court's reasoning for arriving at the Richmond definition of
"special district" was presumably abandoned.'22 In this regard, Jus-
tice Mosk's "stare decisis" concern is very real. 2 3 Anyone reading
the Richmond opinion would inevitably agree with Justice Mosk that
Richmond did not limit itself in the manner the Rider majority sub-
sequently did.124
However, the qualifying language in Richmond suggests that the
court did not discount the real possibility of intentional circumven-
tion of Proposition 13.125 Though this language was dictum, 126 local
governmental entities should not be surprised that Proposition 13 cir-
cumvention is a contributing factor in any section 4 analysis. 27 As
the supreme court stated in Amador, "[tihe literal language of en-
actments may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill
the apparent intent of the framers."' 28 Constitutional enactments
"must receive a liberal, practical common-sense construction [which
meets the] changed conditions and the growing needs of the peo-
ple."'1 29 The Rider decision appears to be an attempt to address these
concerns.
The Rider majority's treatment of Farrell is much more dis-
turbing. In Farrell, the term "special taxes" was analyzed quite
thoroughly and clearly defined. 30 The Rider majority's treatment of
"special taxes" goes entirely counter to language it presented in its
discussion of "special districts.' 3' In effect, the Rider court read
121. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. "It seems
evident that Richmond's limitation ... to those districts possessing property tax power is
unworkable as applied to districts formed after the adoption of Proposition 13 .... [W]e
hold that 'special district' would include any local taxing agency created to raise funds
for city or county purposes to replace revenues lost by reason of the restrictions of Pro-
position 13." Id. But see Vernon v. State Bd. of Equalization, 4 Cal. App. 4th 110, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 414 (1992) (California Supreme Court previously found LACTC not a "special
district" under § 4, thus local tax valid even though two-thirds voter approval was not
acquired).
122. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 64-65, 93-94 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
126. The Richmond decision did not address intentional circumvention because the
LACTC was established prior to the enactment of Proposition 13. See supra notes 41-42
and accompanying text.
127. The language of Amador clearly expresses the court's desire to give adequate
effect to voter initiatives. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 244-45, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299-1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239,
257-58 (1978).
128. Id. at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
129. Id. at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257 (quoting from Los Ange-
les Metro. Transit Auth. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 863, 869, 382 P.2d 583,
586, 31 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (1963)).
130. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
131. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. "[T]he
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"special taxes" out of section 4 as it relates to "special purpose"
districts.132 The court used the "probable intent" of the framers and
voters of Proposition 13 to justify its conclusion, but its reasoning
quite arguably was inconsistent.' 33
The Rider majority felt its new "special tax" 'definition was consis-
tent with Farrell,13  but this conclusion is questionable. The Farrell
opinion stated that "an interpretation which would render terms sur-
plusage should be avoided, and every word should be given some sig-
nificance, leaving no part useless or devoid of meaning.' 1 5 The
Farrell "special tax" definition had been applied in numerous cases
without ignoring alleged voter intent.'3 6
The definitional holdings of Richmond and Farrell were not fol-
lowed in Rider;'3 7 yet, the Rider majority did not clearly indicate to
what extent these two decisions were limited. Rider offers new defi-
nitions for "special districts" and "special taxes" in terms of section
4, while those terms were previously defined in Richmond and Far-
rell. When looking at the definitional holding of Rider, there is little
doubt that the majority presented a new interpretation of section 4.
A second aspect of Rider is its apparent abandonment of the rule
of strict construction concerning section 4's supermajority voting re-
quirement.3 8 This rule was first presented in the plurality opinion of
proposed extension of Richmond to all districts, whenever created, which lack property
tax power would read section 4's reference to 'special districts' out of existence ...." Id.
132. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. See also Rider, I Cal. 4th at
15, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499. "It is true that ... every tax levied by a
,special purpose' district or agency would be deemed a 'special tax.' But this interpreta-
tion seems most consistent with the probable intent of the framers of Proposition 13." Id.
133. The court was willing to read "special taxes" out of § 4; but in defining "spe-
cial districts," the court was concerned that the Richmond definition, if applied here,
would read "special district" out of § 4.
134. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 15, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499.
135. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 54, 648 P.2d 935,
938, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1982). See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 478, 595 P.2d 592, 604, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1979); People v.
Gilbert, I Cal. 3d 475, 480, 462 P.2d 580, 584, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724, 728 (1969); Morro
Hills Community Servs. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 78 Cal. App. 3d 765, 773, 144
Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (1978).
136. See, e.g., Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 149 Cal. App.
3d 82, 196 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1983); Fenton v. City of Delano, 162 Cal. App. 3d 400, 208
Cal. Rptr. 486 (1984); Russ Building Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco,
188 Cal. App. 3d 977, 234 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1987); Shaw v. McMahon, 197 Cal. App. 3d
417, 243 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1987); California Building Industry Ass'n v. Governing Bd. of
the Newhall Sch. Dist. of Los Angeles County, 206 Cal. App. 3d 212, 253 Cal. Rptr.
497 (1988); Cohn v. City of Oakland, 223 Cal. App. 3d 261, 272 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1990).
137. See supra notes 67-68, 75-80 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 38-40, 51-54 and accompanying text.
Richmond 39 and was subsequently accepted by the majority of the
court in Farrell.4 ' The Rider majority also mentioned this rule;' 4'
yet, as the dissent correctly points out, the majority ignored this rule
in favor of preserving the "probable intent" of the initiative voters. 4 2
Since no explanation was" presented,' 43 analysis of this part of the
decision is only speculative. However, the language of the majority
opinion suggests that the court decided to return to the principles
first announced in Amador.14 4 Certainly, the section 4 terms were
thoroughly analyzed in Rider, but the supermajority voting require-
ment was not "strictly construed." Rather than following the
"strictly construed" Richmond and Farrell definitions, the Rider
court instead seemed to ignore this aspect of the precedents. Alterna-
tively, the court disagreed with the rule and chose to abandon it
(though not expressly overruling that part of Richmond and
Farrell).
The last issue concerning precedent treatment involves the court's
focus on legislative intent. The California Supreme Court first sug-
gested its importance in the Richmond case. 145 The intent of the vot-
ers is certainly significant, 146 and even the dissent did not argue
against this.147 The dissent's real dissatisfaction was with the major-
ity's willingness to consider legislative motives.148
The California Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of leg-
islative motivation in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court.4 '
There exists a "historically enshrined legal principle that precludes
any judicially authorized inquiry into the subjective motives or
139. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 203-05, 643 P.2d at 944-45, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327-
28.
140. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 52-53, 648 P.2d at 937-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
See Stephen R. Barnett, The Supreme Court of California, 1981-82. Foreword: The
Emerging Court, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1134, 1164-67 (1983) (discussing the rule of strict
construction). See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
141. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 7, 820 P.2d at 1003, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493.
142. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
143. One might infer the rule was abandoned as not giving sufficient effect to voter
intentions.
144. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
145.. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
146. Throughout the majority opinion, the court discussed both voter and legisla-
tive intent, but it is important to keep these ideas separate.
147. The only aspect of Mosk's dissent concerning voter intent appears to be his
disapproval or questioning of "probable" voter intent. Specifically, his discussion of Pro-
position 36 brings this into issue, but he did not argue against looking at voter intent. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Rider, I Cal. 4th at 28, 820 P.2d at
1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Mosk J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 27-28, 820 P.2d at 1017-18, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507-08. See supra notes
96-97 and accompanying text.
149. 13 Cal. 3d 721, 532 P.2d 495, 119 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1975) (holding that dis-
covery order violated principle precluding judicial inquiry into the motivation or mental
processes of legislators in enacting legislation).
[VOL. 29: 829. 1992] Rider v. County of San Diego
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
mental processes of legislators."' 50 This rule is also invoked when
establishing the validity of such legislation. "[T] he validity of a leg-
islative act does not depend on the subjective motivation of its drafts-
men but rests instead on the objective effect of the legislative
terms."15'
The County of Los Angeles opinion presents language which
seems to support Justice Mosk's criticism. 52 However, it is impor-
tant to realize that the court in County of Los Angeles was faced
with a discovery order that sought to directly inquire into subjective
legislative motivations.' 3 The Rider decision did not specifically ad-
dress subjective motivations, but rather sought to infer improper in-
tent from the realities of the enabling legislation and the surrounding
circumstances and effects.5
The Rider majority did not appear to violate the proscribed "legis-
lative motivation" principle. 5 5 In Rider, no judicial inquiry into sub-
jective legislative motivation was presented. Rather, the majority
considered the effects of the legislation and the factors surrounding
it to infer that Proposition 13 circumvention was intended. 6 Such
150. Id. at 726, 532 P.2d at 498, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 634. This rule applies to local
legislators as well. Id. See also People v. Bigler, 5 Cal. 23, 26 (1855).
151. County of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d at 727, 532 P.2d at 499, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
635. "[A] judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which may have
determined legislators' votes." Werner v. Southern Cal. Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal.
2d 121, 129, 216 P.2d 825, 830 (1950) (quoting Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336
U.S. 220, 224 (1949)).
152. See generally County of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d at 723-32, 532 P.2d at 496-
502, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 632-38. See also Rider, I Cal. 4th at 27-28, 820 P.2d at 1017-18,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507-08.
153. County of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d at 723, 532 P.2d at 496, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
632.
154. See Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 11-13, 820 P.2d at 1006-07, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496-
97. "[W]e believe that courts may infer [circumventional] intent whenever ... the new
tax agency is essentially controlled by one or more cities or counties that otherwise
would have had to comply with the supermajority provision of section 4." Id. at 11, 820
P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
155. See Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1975). "[I]t
is ... clear that we do not engage in the proscribed 'inquiry into the motivation' . ..
when we perceive its purpose to be obvious on the face of the action itself." Id. at 609,
127 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
156. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. See also Soon Hing v. Crow-
ley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885).
And the rule is general with reference to the enactments of all legislative bod-
ies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the legislators in passing
them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible
from their operation .... The motives of the legislators . . .will always be
presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural and reasonable
effect of their enactments.
Id.
an inference does not appear improper; the dissent in Rider seems to
have misread the appropriateness of legislative motivation inquiry'x5
Given the forewarning in Richmond,'58 the Rider court's decision to
introduce intentional circumvention considerations into section 4
analysis does not appear entirely unsupportable.
As Justice Mosk observed, however, the majority's treatment of
legislative motivation is troubling. 5 9 The majority's "essential con-
trol" test presents problems of its own. This Note will analyze this
test next as we turn to the consequences of the Rider decision.
2. Practical Effects of the Decision
Whether or not one agrees with the outcome of Rider, the decision
breaks new ground that will create effects that can only be addressed
by the courts in subsequent decisions. This Note will only discuss
three general areas here, those concerning the utility of the "essen-
tial control" test, the effects on the doctrine of stare decisis, and the
future revenue-raising abilities of local governments.
The Rider court conceded that "marshalling ... evidence of inten-
tional circumvention may be difficult."'' 0 The majority stated that
agency control was the decisive factor in inferring this improper in-
tent when analyzing whether an entity is a "special district" within
the meaning of section 4.161 Thus, the key analysis for future deci-
sions will involve the determination of when that control over the
agency is present. To assist courts in their analyses, the Rider major-
ity presented its "essential control" test. 6 2
Justice Mosk was quick to jump on this test as impractical and
unworkable.16 3 "Several of the factors noted as establishing circum-
ventive intent actually apply to most California districts."'' 6 4 Some of
these over-inclusive factors include common or overlapping gov-
erning boards, common boundaries, and municipality involvement in
agency formation. 6 5 Justice Mosk offered examples that showed, at
least as far as these factors are concerned, the "essential control"
157. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
159. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 28-29, 820 P.2d at 1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508. "Even
assuming that a court may ... [inquire] into the Legislature's motives .. ., the 'essential
control' test propounded by. the majority as the tool to expose circumventive intent is
unworkable." Id.
160. Id. at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. The court had little
difficulty in finding circumventive intent in this case, however.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 11-12, 820 P.2d at 1006-07, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. See supra notes
69-71 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
164. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 29, 820 P.2d at 1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508.
165. Id. at 29, 820 P.2d at 1018-19, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508-09 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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test is of little assistance. 166 This observation appears accurate, since
some agencies found valid in prior decisions could possibly fail this
test.1 7 As Mosk-suggested, certain statutes and schemes actually re-
quire the condition the majority's test holds as indicative of inten-
tional circumvention."6 " The weight given each factor in this test is
unclear; however, it is obvious that many of the factors would not, by
themselves, indicate intentional circumvention of Proposition 13.169
Perhaps, when these factors are combined and applied to future
cases, the utility of the "essential control" test will become more ap-
parent. As the Rider majority stated, "[t]he 'essential control' [test]
is not necessarily the functional equivalent of the 'alter ego' theory
used to 'pierce the corporate veil.' ",170 Rather, the test "simply af-
fords ground for reasonably inferring an intent to circumvent Pro-
position 13. ' 171 However, given the court's new approach to "special
taxes,"' 2 the importance of classifying an agency as a "special dis-
trict" within section 4 takes on added significance.
In light of these considerations, the utility of the "essential con-
trol" test is of great concern to those agencies which seek to operate
within the mandates of section 4. This uncertainty could seriously
jeopardize current and future agency financing efforts and opera-
tions, as suggested by Justice Mosk in his dissent. 173 Bondholders,
banks, and others who finance agency operations may not accept this
new level of risk-taking." 4 Certainly, the risks of financing agencies
have increased as a result of the Rider decision." 5
Perhaps of lesser consequence is Rider's effect on the doctrine of
stare decisis. Justice Mosk suggested that the majority ignored this
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
168. Id. For example, many statutes require common boards, and municipalities
often are involved in forming these agencies which address issues of local concern.
169. The boundaries of the agency and the city (for instance) suggests little about
intent to escape the restrictions of § 4 and the degree of control exercised by the city.
170. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 12, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. In this
regard, the focus of the inquiry is not whether the entities are identical. Id. at 12, 820
P.2d at 1007, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
173. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 31-33, 820 P.2d at 1020-21, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510-11.
174. The risk taking referred to involves the chance that the underlying tax is
found invalid.
175. Accordingly, if banks or bondholders finance agency operations by relying on
the underlying tax for repayment, their financing risks increase if that tax's validity is
uncertain. An equally interested group includes those who contract with or are employed
by these agencies.
doctrine in arriving at its decision.176 Certainly, Richmond and Far-
rell were not followed by the Rider majority, 17 7 but these precedents
were not ignored by the majority either. As discussed above, the ma-
jority analyzed these precedents considerably before applying them
to the Rider facts.
The doctrine of stare decisis is quite detailed, and this Note will
only discuss a few basic principles concerning it. First, the doctrine"applies only to judicial precedents, i.e., to the ratio decidendi or
actual ground of decision of a case cited as authority."'1 78 The Rich-
mond case did not specifically address intentional circumvention of
Proposition 13 since the questioned tax was enacted by a pre-Pro-
position 13 agency. 171 The Richmond opinion, although in dictum,
suggested that its holding may indeed be limited if intentional cir-
cumvention factors were present. 80 The Farrell decision did not con-
tain a similar qualifier, and Justice Mosk's dissent concerning it is
well-founded.' 81 However, this is not to say the doctrine of stare de-
cisis was erroneously ignored.
The California Supreme Court had previously discussed the stare
decisis doctrine in County of Los Angeles v. Faus.'8 Certain lan-
guage in Faus supports the Rider majority's analysis:
The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or inflexible as to preclude a
departure therefrom in any case, but its application must be determined in
each instance by the discretion of the court. Previous decisions should not
be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated and that wrong
may result,'
83
The court in Faus further stated, "[I]t becomes our duty not to
follow decisions that we are convinced are erroneous and obso-
lete."'184 Obviously, the Rider court was disturbed by the "hole in
176. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 25, 820 P.2d at 1016, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
177. See supra notes 114, 137 and accompanying text.
178. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d
891, 902, 603 P.2d 41, 47, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124, 130 (1979) (citing Hart v. Burnett, 15
Cal. 530, 598-99 (1860)). "[A] case is not authority for a point ... not actually decided
by the court." Id. at 902, 603 P.2d at 47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
179. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Equally important, the Rich-
miond opinion did not expressly limit its application to future cases. See supra notes 93-
94 and accompanying text for Justice Mosk's dissenting comments.
181. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
182. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
183. Id. at 679, 312 P.2d at 684-85.
184. Id. at 679, 312 P.2d at 684.
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the fence '18 5 which had emerged following Richmond'86 and Far-
rell.1 87 The Rider majority's treatment of Richmond and Farrell did
not rest on the erroneousness of those decisions, but rather appears
to suggest those cases have been rendered obsolete in certain re-
spects. This conclusion is evidenced by the Rider court's decision to
present new "special district" and "special tax" definitions.
Apparently, Justice Mosk believed the Richmond and Farrell de-
cisions had settled the section 4 definitional problems. 18 8 Certainly,
the definitions developed in those cases will no longer apply to newly
created agencies. However, any damage done to the doctrine of stare
decisis is lessened by the Rider majority's return to the Amador rea-
soning 89 and its desire to meet the mandates imposed by the voters
in passing Proposition 13.190 The treatment of "special districts" by
the Rider majority seems consistent with the reasoning expressed in
the Richmond dictum; however, its treatment of "special taxes" is
less supportable. The stronger argument for stare decisis was the
Farrell decision and its "special tax" definition; yet, the Rider court
appears to have only adjusted the Farrell holding, not completely
abandoning it. In terms of stare decisis, the Rider decision did not
severely damage this well-entrenched doctrine.' 9 '
The last issue under this section concerns future revenue-raising
185. See supra notes 43, 57, 62, 66, 78-79 and accompanying text.
186. See Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
We must attempt to determine whether the framers, in using the term "spe-
cial district," intended to adopt a definition that could so readily permit cir-
cumvention of section 4. The fact that, following Richmond, numerous "special
purpose" districts were created to accomplish aims comparable to LACTC
strongly indicates a large "hole" has indeed been created in Proposition 13,
confirming Justice Richardson's prediction. In our view, the framers of Proposi-
tion 13, and the voters who adopted it, would not have intended that result.
Id. (citation omitted).
187. See id. at 14, 820 P.2d at 1008, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.
We believe the Farrell rationale does not extend to limited purpose agencies
such as the Agency herein. To hold that a tax cannot be deemed a "special
tax" if revenues thereof are deposited in the taxing agency's general fund pulls
any remaining teeth from section 4's restriction on special taxes. As previously
indicated, the trial court applied Farrell's test and nonetheless concluded that
the Agency's sales tax was indeed a "special tax" because its revenues were
earmarked for the specific purpose of funding the County's justice facilities,
and not for "general governmental purposes."
Id. (citation omitted).
188. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
190. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 16, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499.
191. Those agencies and other entities that relied on Richmond and Farrell would
strongly disagree with this conclusion. However, this discussion only covers the stare de-
cisis doctrine itself, not the equity of the Rider decision.
alternatives available to local governments. Under Rider, local gov-
ernments can no longer bypass the section 4 supermajority voting
requirements by creating an agency essentially controlled by the lo-
cal government.19 2 These newly-created agencies will also be unable
to escape the mandates of section 4 by calling their enacted taxes
"general taxes"; rather the courts must determine if these revenues
are used for special governmental projects or programs. 93 Agencies
such as the one involved in Rider will be unable to raise tax revenues
without meeting the two-thirds voting requirements of section 4
when these factors are found. This leaves open the question of how
the Rider decision will affect future local governmental funding
activities.
One area of concern is the effect of Rider on currently existing
agencies and their taxes. 94 The majority felt these agencies may not
be affected by the Rider decision.' 95 The 'majority believed that
many case-specific factors, constitutional issues, and policy consider-
ations may require prospective application of Rider in certain
cases. 196 Because the majority was unwilling to limit the Rider hold-
ing, many agencies may find future litigation concerning their en-
acted taxes inevitable. At that point, the courts may or may not
choose to limit the prospectivity of Rider, but this issue is far from
settled now. Whatever results are reached concerning now existing
agencies and their taxes, the future application of Rider to new local
governmental revenue-raising attempts is clear.'97
This leaves at issue what revenue-raising alternatives still remain.
Several obvious choices immediately emerge, the most logical being
the acquisition of the required two-thirds vote. 9 " Assuming the
supermajority vote cannot be acquired, other alternatives still exist.
One alternative involves the continued efforts of local governments
192. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
194. The Rider majority did not rule on prospective only application of its decision
because that issue was not fully briefed in that case. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 13, 820 P.2d at
1007, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497.
195. Id. For example, many agencies were established by statutes which contain
strict time limitations for challenging their validity. Id. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §
26282 (covering the agency involved in Rider); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 860 (in rem
validation procedure); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 863 (60 day statute of limitations for
agency action challenge). The reach and extent of these sections, and any others that
may apply, are beyond the scope of this Note. See also supra note 114.
196. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 13, 820 P.2d at 1007, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497.
197. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
198. Perhaps this alternative is unavailable since many agencies are formed pre-
cisely because the required supermajority approval attempt failed (Rider is one such
example). Of course, local governments can continue their efforts to gain the required
approval, but at some point, these attempts are useless.
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to create their "special agencies," but with the added focus on meet-
ing the criteria of Rider's "essential control" test.'99 Perhaps the
largest obstacle here is the California Supreme Court's renewed em-
phasis on intentional circumvention.200 If local governments satisfy
the "essential control" test, but otherwise appear to intentionally cir-
cumvent Proposition 13, the court is quite likely to revise the test
and address these new attempts more vigorously.21 In Rider, the
majority addressed intent by focusing on agency control; if future
cases prove this focus misplaced,202 the court can conceivably present
a new "intentional circumvention" approach to better fulfill the in-
tent of Proposition 13 voters.
Other financing attempts have been utilized, with some also suffer-
ing the same fate as the Rider Agency's sales tax.203 Two methods
that have realized some success are special benefit assessments and
governmental fees.2 0 4 Although these alternatives may assist some
service financing, others are clearly inapplicable.20 5 Even the use of
special assessments and governmental fees may be questioned given
the expansive reasoning of Rider.20 6
Although Rider clearly involved a sales tax, the court seemed
most concerned with Proposition 13 circumvention and voter intent.
Since property tax relief was found affected by the sales tax in
199. The ethics involved here are not endorsed nor condemned. If a true
"nonintentional" circumventive agency can exist, local governments are surely free to
pursue this option. However, considering the various factors in the test (especially the
involvement of municipalities in agency formation), this avenue appears blocked.
200. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
201. It should be remembered that the agency in Rider was held to be obviously
created to circumvent Proposition 13. The "essential control" test was offered merely to
guide courts in more dubious situations. See supra notes 69-71, 160-62 and accompany-
ing text.
202. For example, agency formation, property ownership, or some other factor may
rise to the top as most determinative, leaving agency control as not decisive. See also
supra note 114.
203. See, e.g., Bixel Assocs. v. City of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1208, 1220,
265 Cal. Rptr. 347, 355 (1989) (fire hydrant fee invalid); Beaumont Investors v. Beau-
mont-Cherry Valley Water Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 227, 238, 211 Cal. Rptr. 567, 573
(1985) (water connection fee struck down). See generally Julie K. Koyama, Comment,
Financing Local Government in the Post-Proposition 13 Era: The Use and Effectiveness
of Nontaxing Revenue Sources, 22 PAc. L.J. 1333 (1991) (discussing special benefit as-
sessments and governmental fees).
204. Koyama, supra note 203, at 1364. New issues arise with these methods,
namely whether there exist enabling statutes and whether the fees are really taxes in
disguise. Id. at 1357, 1360.
205. Funding jail facilities with user fees is certainly unlikely and possibly
unconscionable.
206. See supra notes 61-63, 66-67, 75-80 and accompanying text.
Rider, other similar fees and assessments might also be reclassified
as "Proposition 13 circumvention." Local governments must surely
hope that Rider is not expanded to encompass these other methods
of revenue raising.
One final alternative for local governments' 0  is pursuit, through
initiative or otherwise, of legislative clarification. Much of the Rider
discussion on voter intent was speculative, though arguably rea-
soned.208 When voters passed Proposition 13, the focus was on prop-
erty tax relief; the Richmond decision turned on this reasoning.20 9
Rider has now appeared to expand Proposition 13's coverage by
eliminating the property tax power requirement and focusing instead
on the effects of the "special tax."21 Property owners certainly gain
tax relief, but those not owning property will also benefit.
A clarification of what Proposition 13 actually should and does
cover is warranted. However, now that the Rider decision has given
relief to all San Diego County taxpayers, reneging that relief
through the initiative process appears insurmountable. Since the
courts have received little guidance from analyzing the voter pam-
phlets that accompanied Proposition 13,211 any future statement by
the voters can only be prospective.21 2 Yet, if local governments be-
come dysfunctional because of insufficient funding, 1 3 these same
voters will suffer the effects.214 This could be a heavy price to pay for
basing court decisions like Rider on the "probable intent" of the
voters.215
207. The presented alternatives are by no means exhaustive. They have been of-
fered only for example. Local governments have other ideas and some may currently be
in use.
208. This whole area of initiative intent is beyond the scope of this Note. However,
the Rider case shows one example of the difficulty courts have in interpreting unclear
voter intent. One wonders what emphasis should be placed on framer intent (i.e., com-
ments made by H. Jarvis and P. Gann). For further discussion on initiatives and their
problems, see generally Marilyn E. Minger, Comment, Putting the "Single" Back in the
Single-Subject Rule: A Proposal for Initiative Reform in California, 24 U.C. DAvIs L.
REv. 879 (1991); Douglas R. Roach, Note, Zoning by Initiative in Arizona: A Matter of
Judicial Philosophy, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 1003 (1990); James E. Castello, Comment, The
Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Proce-
dure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491 (1986). For a discussion on pre-election judicial review, see
generally James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAI E L. REV. 298 (1989).
209. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
210. Le., does the new agency enact taxes which replace funds lost due to Proposi-
tion 13? See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
212. New voters have entered California since Proposition 13 was enacted, and
presumably several voters who approved the initiative have deceased or left the state.
213. This suggestion is purely speculative, since this Note does not analyze budget-
ing activities of local governments.
214. Also consider those who have contracted with, financed, or worked for "inva-
lid" agencies.
215. See supra notes 66, 80 and accompanying text.
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Two other issues which concern the Rider case deserve brief dis-
cussion. First, the issue remains as to what remedy is warranted in
light of the invalidity of the sales tax. Since sales tax revenues were
collected,216 tracing these proceeds to the actual taxpayers who paid
them would appear impossible. One obvious remedy is an offsetting
sales tax reduction until the invalid tax collections are "returned" to
the taxpayers of the county. Another possibility is that the Agency
may be allowed to retain these tax receipts to meet the obligations
entered into in reliance on Richmond and Farrell. This alternative is
highly unlikely, given the language in Rider"7 and the United States
Supreme Court's position in recent years.2 1s The most likely remedy
will be a sales tax rate reduction until the collections are returned to
the general taxpayers of San Diego County.
One final issue involves the constitutionality of Proposition 13 it-
self. 19 A California case, Nordlinger v. Hahn,2 0 is currently pend-
ing before the United States Supreme Court. Nordlinger challenges
the constitutionality of Proposition 13's acquisition value assessment
method.2 1 Even if the United States Supreme Court finds the as-
sessment method of Proposition 13 unconstitutional in Nordlinger,
this would not appear to jeopardize section 4 because of the sever-
ability clause in section 6.222
However, the validity of remaining sections of article XIIIA
should not be assumed. The Nordlinger case could very well affect
the future application of Proposition 13 as a whole. Yet, the Rider
216. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 109, 144, 185-87 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco,
Dep't. of Bus. Reg., 496 U.S. 18 (1990) (discussing remedies of state excise tax found
unconstitutional under federal law); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct.
2439 (1991) (prior ruling invalidating similar state excise tax under the Commerce
Clause applies retroactively). But cf. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287
U.S. 358 (1932) (remedies for violation of state law rest with the state).
219. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing Amador and the state
constitutional challenge).
220. Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990), cert.
granted sub norn. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
221. This challenge was apparently prompted by Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (assessments on real property by West Virginia
county violated Equal Protection clause). See Marian Adams Harvey, Note, Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County: Equal Protection in
Property Taxation, A New Challenge to Proposition 13?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173
(1989).
222. See CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA, § 6. "If any section ... is for any reason held to
be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining sections shall not be affected but will re-
main in full force and effect." Id.
court may have set the stage for another constitutional challenge to
Proposition 13 when it gave section 4 an expansive reach (i.e., cover-
ing sales taxes). Section 4's new expansive reading may expose Pro-
position 13 to constitutional challenge irrespective of the Nordlinger
outcome.22 3
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court gave Proposition 13 (specifically
article XIIIA, section 4) additional strength when it invalidated the
sales tax in Rider v. County of San Diego. Prior to this decision,
section 4 had been limited to those "special districts" which had the
power to levy a property tax. The supreme court in Rider discarded
this requirement and instead offered a new definition of "special dis-
tricts" by adding intentional circumvention factors into the analysis.
In like manner, the definition of "special taxes" was also changed to
plug further "holes" that had been created in section 4's protective
fence.
Although the taxpayers of San Diego County may benefit from
these new interpretations in the form of lower taxes, those local gov-
ernmental entities that had relied on the previous section 4 interpre-
tations were caught by surprise. Perhaps the results of Rider v.
County of San Diego would be more acceptable if the court had not
discarded its past reasoning along with its past definitions. The court
expanded the reach of section 4 from property tax relief only to
other tax relief that incidentally affects property tax relief.
The "essential control" test was developed to assist courts in ana-
lyzing intentional circumvention of Proposition 13 by focusing on
agency control. The utility of this test is yet to be determined; how-
ever, several of the test factors arguably offer little assistance in
showing circumvention motivations.
The consequences of this decision are also yet to be seen, but local
governments can be assured that future revenue-raising efforts will
become much more difficult. The court plugged "the hole in the
fence" that past interpretations of section 4 had created, but in a
manner inconsistent with their past reasoning and analyses; the rule
of strict construction was ignored.
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court in Rider has presented
new section 4 definitions of "special districts" and "special taxes."
Local governments, for better or for worse, must now adapt their
financing activities in light of these new guidelines. No longer will
local governments be able to create new "limited purpose" agencies
223. Subsequent to the writing of this Note, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Nordlinger decision. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (Cali-
fornia property tax system did not violate equal protection).
[VOL. 29: 829. 1992] Rider v. County of San Diego
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
with limited taxing powers without risking the invalidation of their
taxes because of Proposition 13 intentional circumvention.
Although this may have been the original intent of the proposi-
tion's voters in passing the initiative, ten years of precedent sug-
gested otherwise. The Rider court chose to give Proposition 13 back
its teeth, while possibly jeopardizing local governmental financing.
The sole justification offered was the enforcement of the "probable
intent" of Proposition 13 voters.
WILLIAM A. STAHR

